I don't know enough about what's going on in cogsci to evaluate the novelty of this claim, but my current thinking about un/conscious dynamics is something like this:
1. Dennett's basic premise of the "multiple drafts" model of conscious is correct, but the PFC is really privileged.
2.a. There are lots of phenomenal events that don't get integrated into the narrative stream of consciousness
2b. A lot of these phenomenal events are "remembered" (or cached?) in faculties outside of the PFC.
4. There are lots of atypical brains that have managed to put experience together in ways that are very much unlike Daniel Dennett's or my own.
5. Even if there were a strong qualitative basis for asserting neurotypical norms (IE if we could strongly say that some brain-types are "better"), it still would probably be bad in policy. Instead, we should probably treat neurodiversity as one of the basic protected types in ethical and epistemic pluralism, if not more basic than EG race or religion.
6. The gatekeeping of who/what has conscious experience is not terribly interesting or generative.
7. The "infinite game" instead suggests that we should focus on forms of play that are going to help us integrate and benefit from the novelty and surprise generated from atypical symbol-users (including AI). Let's see what they have to offer to others, meaning in this case what others can integrate and develop further.