Having trouble finding something that critiques Girard from a (neo)Confucian perspective. It feels pretty basic to point out that the basic constitution of individuality in the Girardian system occurs through control of an external referent and defended against mimetic rivalry.
But the Confucian system doesn't seem to take place in a much more enmeshed social reality -- one in which an assertion of independence would bring overpowering social sanction, &therefore the individual achieves identity through ritual and deference. Seems like a totally different polarity.
Maybe Fukuyama's *Identity* book covers this? His "political order" project took China as the normative case, so maybe he loosens up on his neoplatonic shtick. IDK let me know if you have recommendations.
Let's say that you're imagining a really enmeshed kin-group that has to rely on each other for everything, down to the basics of survival. It basically enmeshes everyone emotionally and any particular person only gets to *borrow* identity or role from this family-system, which basically has narcissism at the group level.
It seems obvious to me that the whole thing must push mimetic rivalry to the kin-group level. Only the most subtle kinds of mimetic rivalry are safe inside such a system.
Mimetic rivalry in a differentiated kin group: "Mom always liked you best."
Mimetic rivalry in an enmeshed kin group: "Let's all scapegoat the Smith family."
So anyway I'm proposing that in a profoundly enmeshed community, a "quantitative" individuation (I, me, and mine) might not be possible. Instead identity might be borrowed from a "quantitative" totality (us, we, and ours). And what is borrowed from the totality is a "relational" individuation (filial piety, role, and rite).