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For a normal-form game G and a player i, can removing actions from player i yield a better Nash equilibrium *for i*?
Has this been investigated?
Well, slightly, since game theory is so rarely applicable
@niplav This is one of the motivations for precommitments as a strategy, isn't it? At least the practical version. And I think I saw mentioned that this concept itself is as old as Sun Tzu, but low confidence.
Huh, I think you're right. In chicken you can improve the situation for one player by removing the option to swerve for them. So you precommit for them…
@timorl I change my mind on this.
@niplav it seems trivially true that there are cases where this applies, but I don't think you can make a strong statement about how to get more general or specific than saying "sometimes, yes."
By contrast, it seems like coordination between players is like the Swiss Army Knife of game theory.
This actually cruxes my position on explotation