Excessive metacognition undermines recursive self-trust between subagents
Thus: Epistemic rationality is counter to instrumental rationality?
Unless you develop a metacognition which is good at finding goal-representations which subsume subagents values and allow for tradeoff
@niplav so, one strat i've been using for ~1 months: whenever some subunit wants us to do A, but other subunit (me) wants to do B, i give pay the first subunit's happy-price with (vegan) chocolate as currency. i bought a stack just for this purpose. ~embarrassingly, it seems effective.
note: the chocolate isn't *reward* for "winning" a conflict w subunit. it's to pay happy-price for doing B, so parts can harmoniously do B. if subunit has no happy-price, i often just do A.
@rime nice! Inspired by Wentworths Why Subagents?
@niplav Alas, my reading-days are mostly behind me, so I hadn't heard of this post. D:
Not all subagents like vegan chocolate, but the one which is like "meh, doing flashcards rn wud be monotonous—too much lk the other thing we just did—so lets do smth else" does, so there are enough bargaining-opportunities.
Also, I generally don't do the chocolate-thing to get myself to do chores, since I want to associate chocolate w math/flashcards instead.
@niplav Relatedly, I've recently discovered that artificial sweetener is ridiculously cheap and likely harmless, so I add them to my tea ("blasphetea") while I do activities I want to associate more rewarding-sensations with. I don't spike my tea when I have off-day due to sick, or when I'm on Schelling.pt.
Prob neither (chocolate & sweetener) are like generally effective, but they are *smth* to try, and just *attempting* coordination makes it a Schelling point that placebo-works anyway.
